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(57) 	 ABSTRACT 
A process includes determining a probability of a failure 
mode of a system being analyzed reaching a failure limit as a 
function of time to failure limit, determining a probability of 
a mitigation of the failure mode as a function of a time to 
failure limit, and quantifying a risk reduction based on the 
probability of the failure mode reaching the failure limit and 
the probability of the mitigation. 
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FAILURE DETECTION SYSTEM RISK 
REDUCTION ASSESSMENT 
This application was made with government support under 
Contract No. NNM06AB13C awarded by NASA. The Gov- 5 
ernment may therefore have certain rights in this invention. 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
This application relates to failure detection systems, and 10 
more particularly to a method for determining the risk reduc-
tion of a given failure detection system. 
A failure detection system ("FDS") may be used to identify 
failure signatures (e.g. a loss of engine coolant) indicative of 
failure modes (e.g. a radiator leak) in the hope that identifi- 15 
cation of the signature can prevent the failure mode from 
causing a failure limit (e.g. engine reaching temperature at 
which engine block will crack). 
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION 	 20 
A process includes determining a probability of a failure 
mode of a system being analyzed reaching a failure limit as a 
function of time to failure limit, determining a probability of 
a mitigation of the failure mode as a function of a time to 25 
failure limit, and quantifying a risk reduction based on the 
probability of the failure mode reaching the failure limit and 
the probability of the mitigation. 
A computer-implemented system includes a storage mod-
ule and a microprocessor. The storage module stores at least 30 
one failure mode and at least one failure signature for a 
system being analyzed. The microprocessor is operable to 
determine a probability of the at least one failure mode of the 
system being analyzed reaching a failure limit as a function of 
time to failure limit, determine a probability of a mitigation of 35 
the failure mode as a function of a time to failure limit, and 
quantify a risk reduction based on the probability of the 
failure mode reaching the failure limit and the probability of 
the mitigation. 
These and other features of the present invention can be 40 
best understood from the following specification and draw-
ings, the following of which is a brief description. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
45 
2 
to simply performing a manual inspection of a structure, such 
as a vehicle. As another example, a FDS may correspond to a 
Health and usage Monitoring System ("HUMS") used to 
monitor the health of critical components of a vehicle, such as 
a rocket, and used to collect operational flight data utilizing 
on-board accelerometers, sensors, and avionic systems. One 
example of a HUMS FDS is the Advanced Health Manage-
ment System (` AHMS"). A system being analyzed may have 
no FDS, such that a failure mode is simply allowed to follow 
its natural course which may or may not lead to a failure limit. 
In a given system, there may be a plurality of failure modes. 
A failure mode is a characteristic manner by which a failure 
occurs. A failure mode may represent a specific way in which 
a system, device or process (e.g., aircraft, automobile, weld-
ing process, etc.) can fail. 
Using the example of an automobile, one example failure 
mode is a radiator leak. This failure mode has many possible 
consequences. For example, as a result of the radiator leak, 
the engine could overheat beyond a threshold temperature, 
resulting in a final outcome of a cracked engine block, caus-
ing the engine to no longer work. Another example conse-
quence could be an engine heating causing a gas line to break, 
with a final outcome of an engine fire. 
A failure mode may have an associated failure limit, which 
is a defined as a failure threshold that can occur if a failure 
mode is left untreated. For example, a failure limit may be a 
known engine temperature beyond which engine damage will 
occur. A FDS seeks to predict or provide notification of a 
failure mode, to give a system operator an opportunity to 
prevent a failure limit from occurring. 
A signature is a basic failure building block that is indica-
tive of a given failure mode. For example, signatures of a 
radiator leak failure mode could include loss of engine cool-
ant, and could also include a gas line leak. Each signature may 
have an associated time-to-failure limit ("TTFL"), which is 
an elapsed time from an onset of the failure signature until a 
system reaches a failure limit. 
It can be useful to compare different failure detection sys-
tems. For example, if a new FDS was very costly, a service 
provider of the FDS may wish to justify the increased cost of 
the FDS by demonstrating its improvement over a previous 
FDS. This improvement could be represented in the form of a 
risk reduction of the FDS. Equation 1, shown below, may be 
used to determine a risk reduction of a FDS. 
FIG.1 schematically illustrates a method of determining a 
risk reduction of a failure detection system. 
FIG. 2a schematically illustrates a first example failure 
probability density function. 
FIG. 2b schematically illustrates a second example failure 
probability density function. 
FIG. 2c schematically illustrates a third example failure 
probability density function. 
FIG. 3 schematically illustrates an effectiveness function. 
FIG. 4 schematically illustrates a computer-implemented 
system operable to perform the method of FIG. 1. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED 
EMBODIMENT 
A failure detection system ("FDS") seeks to predict or 
provide notification of failures, to give a system operator an 
opportunity to prevent the occurrence of a failure limit in a 
system being analyzed (e.g., aircraft, automobile, welding 
process, etc.). Using the example of an automobile, a FDS 
could be, for example, a simple engine warning light, or a 
temperature gauge. A more primitive FDS could correspond 
FPMM reduced _by_FDS 	 equation #1 
R.R.ha non = 
FPMM original 
50 
where 
R.R. fraatio„ is a risk reduction fraction; 
FPMM_reduced by_FDS is a failure limit occurrence 
probability reduction (optionally measured in failures 
55 	 per million missions) after application of a selected fail- 
ure detection system; and 
FPMM_original is failure limit occurrence probability 
reduction (optionally measured in failures per million 
missions) prior to application of the selected failure 
60 	 detection system; 
FIG.1 schematically illustrates a method 100 of determin-
ing a risk reduction of a failure detection system. The method 
100 may be used to determine FPMM reduced by_FDS as 
shown in equation #1. The method 100 receives a plurality of 
65 failure modes for a system being analyzed (step 102). In one 
example the plurality of failure modes is received from an 
existing failure mode and effects analysis ("FMEA") system. 
US 8,214,317 B2 
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Of course, the failure modes may be received from other 
sources, or maybe independently developed. The method 100 
also receives a plurality of failure signatures (step 104). While 
it is understood that the method 100 could be performed with 
a single failure mode and a single failure signature, the 5 
method 100 will be described in relation to a plurality of 
failure modes and a plurality of failure signatures to provide 
an understanding of the wide applicability and scalability of 
the method 100. 
A risk probability is determined for each of the plurality of 10 
failure modes (step 106). The risk probability corresponds to 
a likelihood that a selected failure mode will occur. In one 
example the probability is determined as a failure per million 
missions ("FPMM"), which is the failure probability of 10` 15 
per mission. Of course, other probability benchmarks could 
be used. Various sources of information may be used for this 
determination, such as historical data, engineering analysis, 
and test and field usage data. Engineering analysis data may 
include, for example, data from computer simulations. Thus, 20 
both historical data of actual failures and predicted data of 
future failures may be used in determining the FPMM risk 
probability. 
A robust risk probability determination may include 
accounting for variations in a given system. Using the 25 
example of an engine, when the engine comes off an assembly 
line, there are often variations of engine characteristics 
between engines produced from the same assembly line. For 
example, dimensions, pump efficiency, duct resistance, etc. 
may vary from one engine to another due to a margin of error 30 
in manufacturing. This can make predicting engine perfor-
mance and predicting engine failure challenging. To address 
this difficulty, computer software may be used to generate 
random values (e.g., engine efficiencies, engine resistances, 35 
etc.) within a predicted range of variation. These randomly 
generated values may be used to produce a predicted cluster 
of engine builds, which could include both high performing 
and low performing engines. This predicted cluster could 
then be used in the determination of step 106. In one example 40 
the Monte Carlo class of computational algorithms may be 
used to determine a predicted cluster of engine builds. Of 
course, other algorithms and computer-based software and 
simulations could be used. 
A correlation ranking is determined for each of the plural- 45 
ity of failure signatures according to a scale (step 108). The 
correlation ranking corresponds to a likelihood that a given 
signature represents the at least one failure mode. In one 
example the scale is 0-5, with 5 corresponding to a strong 
correlation between the failure mode and signature, and 0 50 
corresponding to no correlation between the failure mode and 
the signature. Of course, other scales and values could be 
used. Sources used in determining the correlation ranking 
could include, for example, historical data, engineering 
analysis and expert opinion. 	 55 
Returning to the example failure mode of an automobile 
radiator failure, the signature of an engine overheating may be 
assigned a correlation value of "5" (high correlation to radia-
tor failure), the signature of a gas line rupture may be assigned 
a ranking of "1" (low correlation to radiator failure), and a 60 
signature of loss of tire pressure maybe assigned a rank of"0" 
(no correlation to radiator failure). 
A failure mode risk probability is determined for each of 
the plurality of signatures for that failure mode (step 110). 
The risk probability compares comparing a ranking of a 65 
selected signature to a sum of all rankings for a failure mode, 
and may be calculated using equation #2 below.  
4 
Rank.. 	 equation #2 
FPMM;, 
= m-n 
	
FPMM; 
Y Rank in 
m =, 
where 
i is a failure mode number; 
j is a signature number; 
n is a quantity of signatures for the failure mode; and 
FPMM, 17  is a failure limit occurrence probability reduction 
for the given failure mode (see step 106). 
As an example, assume that a automobile radiator failure is 
a first failure mode, and has a riskprobability from step 106 of 
"10" (FPMM,= I0") Assume also that signature 1 has a 
correlation rank of 5, signature 2 has a correlation rank of 1, 
and signature 3 has a correlation rank of 0. The denominator 
in equation #2 would be 5+1+0=6 (sum of correlation rank-
ings). Signature 1 would then be assigned a risk probability of 
6 * 10 = 8.33 (FPMMi,I), 
signature 2 would be assigned a risk probability of 
6 10 = 1.67 (FPMM1,2), 
and signature 3 would be assigned a risk probability of 
6 * 10 = 0.0 (FPMM1 , 3 ). 
Adding the various risk probabilities would yield a failure 
mode 1 total risk probability of 8.33+1.67+00.0=10.0. 
For each failure signatures having a non-zero correlation 
ranking, a distribution is determined (step 112) correspond-
ing to a probability that the signature will occur at a given 
TTFL. The distribution is a failure probability density func-
tion ("f function"). The "f function" captures a tendency of a 
signature to occur slowly (large TTFL), or quickly (small 
TTFL). Each "f function" may be determined in response to 
historical data, engineering modeling, and engineering judg-
ment, for example. 
FIG. 2a schematically illustrates a first example "f func-
tion" 40a in which all failures occur in 0.6 seconds 
(TTFL-0.6 seconds). 
FIG. 2b schematically illustrates a second example "ffunc-
tion" 40b in which 20% of all failures occur in 0.4 seconds 
(TTFL-0.4 seconds), 30% of all failures occur in 0.7 seconds 
(TTFL-0.7 seconds), and 50% of all failures occur in 1.2 
seconds (TTFL=1.2 seconds). The sum of all percentages is 
20%+30%+50%=100%. 
FIG. 2c schematically illustrates a third example "f func-
tion" 40a which represents a continuous distribution curve 42 
that is skewed to fast failures. 
An effectiveness score, or "g function," corresponding to 
an ability to respond to each of the signatures to prevent a 
failure using a FDS as a function of TTFL is determined (step 
114). Each "g function" may be determined in response to 
engineering modeling of a system, the FDS, and failure sig-
natures over a range of TTFL values, for example. A "g 
function" is solely failure signature dependent, and is consid- 
US 8,214,317 B2 
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ered to be the same for all failure modes. In one example the 
"g function" values range from "0" in which a failure cannot 
be prevented (not effective at all) to "I" in which there is 
adequate time to prevent a failure (fully effective). 
FIG. 3 schematically illustrates a "g function" in a graph 
50. In the graph 50, the "g function" corresponds to a con-
tinuous distribution curve 52. At a point 54 the failure signa-
ture is not effective at all, as it occurs so fast that failure cannot 
be prevented. However, at a point 56 it is completely effective, 
indicating that a failure occurs slowly and there is enough 
time to take action to prevent failure. 
A failure limit occurrence probability reduction for each of 
the plurality of signatures is calculated (step 116) using equa-
tion #3 below: 
  
fTf 
 
T-t 
f 
 
j ( T T~Sj (TTF)d TTF 
equation #3 
FPMM;j
F.L.O.P.R.;j = 	
T 	 fo
T_r fj(TFF)d7TF
dt 
 
where 
i is a failure mode number; 
j is a signature number; 
T is a total mission duration; 
t is a mission elapsed time; and 
EL.O.P.R., 17  is the probability that a failure mode would 
reach a failure limit for a selected failure mode and a 
selected failure signature in the system being analyzed 
but is mitigated by an FDS. 
The FDS F.L.O.P.R. for a given TTFL is the product of "f 
functions" and "g functions" for that TTFL. For example, if 
the probability that the failure signature occurs at a TTFL of 
0.1 seconds is f (0.1) -0.8 but the effectiveness at 0.1 seconds 
is g (0.1)-0.0, then there is insufficient time to react to the 
failure signature, the failure limit will be reached, and no risk 
reduction can be realized (0.8*0.0 -0.0). Equation #3 takes 
into account the reduction in the TTFL range of interest as a 
mission proceeds. For example, for a mission duration of 520 
seconds, the TTFL range of interest at the beginning of the 
mission is a range of 0.0-520.0 seconds since a failure can 
start at time=0.0 and fail right at the end of the mission 
(time=520). At mission time t, the TTFL range of interest is 
520.0—t since any failures taking longer than 520.0—t will 
occur after the mission is over, and the only time of concern is 
during the mission. The calculation of equation #3 above 
assumes that the risk of failure is uniform throughout the 
mission. The denominator of equation #3 is a normalizing 
function, which ensures that the result of the integration 
rT 
is in a range of 0-1. 
Steps 106-116 maybe selectively repeated for a plurality of 
failure modes (step 118). 
A sum of failure limit occurrence probability reductions 
for all failure modes and signatures is calculated (step 120) to 
predict the overall failure limit occurrence probability reduc-
tion for the FDS, using equation #4 below. 
where 
m is a quantity of failure modes; 
n is a quantity of signatures; F.L.O.P.R.O1,_,, is a probability that a failure limit would 
10 	 be reached in the system being analyzed but is mitigated 
by a FDS. 
Once the sum from step 120 is available, the sum may be 
compared to (e.g. divided by) an overall failure limit occur-
rence probability in the system being analyzed without imple- 
15 mentation of the FDS to determine a FDS risk reduction 
fraction, as shown in equation #1 (step 122). 
Referring again to the example of an automobile, assume 
that a failure probability before introducing an FDS is 100 
FPMM, and assume that each "mission" is a 100 mile drive at 
20 60 MPH. Failure modes may include radiator failure, tire 
failure, and transmission failure. Failure signatures may 
include engine heating, loss of power to wheels, and loss of 
ability to accelerate. A maximum TTFL of interest at the 
beginning of the mission is 100/600=1.67 hours, which 
25 decreases to zero at the end of the mission. Assuming intro-
duction of an FDS reduces an overall risk by 50 FPMM (the 
sum of the contributions of all the signatures over all the 
failure modes), yielding a risk reduction of 50% (by using 
equation #1). 
30 	 FIG. 4 schematically illustrates a computer-implemented 
system 60 operable to perform the method of FIG. 1. A 
computer 62 includes at least one microprocessor 64 in com-
munication with storage 66 and in communication with an 
input/output module 68. The storage 66 could include 
35 memory, hard drives, or any electronic, optical, magnetic or 
another type of computer storage. The computer 61 is oper-
able to receive at least one failure mode 70 and a plurality of 
failure signatures 72, and is operable to determine a risk 
reduction 74 in response to the data 70, 72 by performing the 
40 method 100. 
While applications for an automobile have been described 
for the sake of simplicity of explanation, it is understood that 
in the disclosed embodiment the method 100 could be utilized 
in a FDS for other systems, such as gas turbine engines. 
45 Although embodiments of this invention have been dis-
closed, a worker of ordinary skill in this art would recognize 
that certain modifications would come within the scope of this 
invention. For that reason, the following claims should be 
studied to determine the true scope and content of this inven- 
50 tion. 
What is claimed is: 
1. A process comprising: 
determining a probability of a failure mode of a system 
55 	 being analyzed reaching a failure limit as a function of 
time to failure limit; 
determining a probability of a mitigation of the failure 
mode as a function of a time to failure limit; and 
quantifying a risk reduction based on the probability of the 
60 	 failure mode of reaching the failure limit and the prob- 
ability of the mitigation. 
2. A process comprising: 
determining a probability of a failure mode of a system 
being analyzed reaching a failure limit as a function of 
65 	 time to failure limit; 
determining a probability of a mitigation of the failure 
mode as a function of a time to failure limit; and 
6 
. 1 
	
equation #4 
F.L,.O.P.Llo _11 = E E F.L,.O.P.i j 
i=1 j=1 
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quantifying a risk reduction based on the probability of the 	 sponding to the distribution of said step (d) and a function 
	
failure mode of reaching the failure limit and the prob- 	 corresponding to the effectiveness score of said step (e). 
ability of the mitigation, 	 11. The method of claim 9, wherein the failure detection 
wherein said step of determining a probability of a failure system is a first failure detection system, and wherein said 
of a system being analyzed as a function of time to 5 step (h) includes dividing the sum of failure limit occurrence 
failure limit includes: probabilities for the first failure detection system by a sum of 
	
a) determining a risk probability for at least one failure 	 failure limit occurrence probabilities for a second failure 
	
mode, the risk probability corresponding to a likeli- 	 detection system. 
	
hood that the at least one failure mode will occur in the 	 12. The method of claim 8, wherein said step of determin- 
system being analyzed; 	 io ing a probability of a mitigation of the failure as a function of 
	
b) determining a correlation ranking for at least one 	 a time to failure limit includes: 
	
failure signature, the correlation ranking correspond- 	 f) calculating a failure limit occurrence probability reduc- 
	
ing to a likelihood that the at least one failure signa- 	 tion for the at least one signature in response to the 
ture represents the at least one failure mode; 	 effectiveness score; 
c) determining a failure mode risk probability for the at 15 	 g) selectively repeating steps (a)-(f) for a plurality of fail- 
	
least one failure signature comparing the correlation 	 ure modes; 
	
ranking of the at least one failure signature to a sum of 
	
h) calculating a sum of failure limit occurrence probability 
	
all correlation rankings for a signature set, the signa- 	 reductions from said step (g) for each signature in the 
	
ture set including at least the at least one failure sig- 	 signature set; and 
nature; and 	 20 	 i) comparing the sum of failure limit occurrence probabil- 
	
d) determining a distribution corresponding to a prob- 	 ity reductions for the failure detection system to a sum of 
	
ability that the at least one failure signature will occur 	 overall failure limit occurrence probabilities in the sys- 
	
at a given time to failure limit in the system being 	 tem being analyzed without implementation of the fail- 
analyzed. 	 ure detection system to determine a risk reduction of the 
3. The method of claim 2, wherein said step (a) is per-  25 	 failure detection system. 
	
formed in response to historical data of actual failures, pre- 	 13. A computer-implemented system, comprising: 
dicted data of future failures, or both. 	 a storage module storing at least one failure mode for a 
4. The method of claim 2, wherein said step (a) includes: 	 system being analyzed; and 
predicting a cluster of systems being analyzed; 	 a microprocessor, the microprocessor being operable to 
	
determining a probability that the failure mode will occur 30 	 determine a probability of the at least one failure mode 
in each system in the cluster; and 	 of the system being analyzed reaching a failure limit as 
	
averaging the probabilities to determine an overall prob- 	 a function of time to failure limit, determine a probabil- 
	
ability that the failure mode will occur in the system 	 ity of a mitigation of the failure mode as a function of a 
being analyzed. 	 time to failure limit, and quantify a risk reduction based 
5. The system of claim 2, wherein the correlation ranking 35 	 on the probability of the failure mode reaching the fail- 
of said step (b) is in a range from 0-5. 	 ure limit and the probability of the mitigation. 
6. The method of claim 2, wherein said step (d) is only 	 14. The system of claim 13, wherein an input/output mod- 
	
performed for a selected failure signature if the selected fail- 	 ule is also operable to receive a plurality of failure signatures, 
ure signature has a non-zero correlation ranking. 	 and to output the risk reduction. 
7. The method of claim 2, wherein the system being ana-  40 15. A computer-implemented system, comprising: 
lyzed is a machine or a process. 	 a storage module storing at least one failure mode for a 
8. The method of claim 2, wherein said step of determining 	 system being analyzed; 
	
a probability of a mitigation of the failure as a function of a 	 a microprocessor, the microprocessor being operable to 
time to failure limit includes: 	 determine a probability of the at least one failure mode 
	
e) determining an effectiveness score corresponding to an 45 	 of the system being analyzed reaching a failure limit as 
	
ability to respond to the at least one failure signature 	 a function of time to failure limit, determine a probabil- 
	
using a failure detection system to prevent the at least 	 ity of a mitigation of the failure mode as a function of a 
	
one failure mode from reaching a failure limit in the 	 time to failure limit, and quantify a risk reduction based 
	
system being analyzed as a function of time to failure 	 on the probability of the failure mode reaching the fail- 
limit. 	 50 	 ure limit and the probability of the mitigation; and 
	
9. The method of claim 8, wherein said step of quantifying 	 an input/output module operable to receive a plurality of 
	
a risk reduction based on the probability of the failure and the 	 failure signatures, and to output the risk reduction, 
probability of the mitigation includes: 	 wherein the microprocessor determines a probability of a 
	
f) calculating a failure limit occurrence probability reduc- 	 failure of a system being analyzed as a function of time 
tions for the at least one signature in response to the 55 	 to failure limit by determining a risk probability for at 
effectiveness score; 	 least one failure mode, determining a correlation rank- 
	
g) calculating a sum of failure limit occurrence probability 	 ing for at least one failure signature, determining a fail- 
	
reductions from said step (f) for each signature in the 	 ure mode risk probability for the at least one failure 
signature set; and 	 signature comparing the correlation ranking of the at 
	
h) comparing the sum of failure limit occurrence probabil-  60 	 least one failure signature to a sum of all correlation 
	
ity reductions for the failure detection system to a sum of 	 rankings for a signature set, and determining a distribu- 
	
overall failure limit occurrence probabilities in the sys- 	 tion corresponding to a probability that the at least one 
	
tem being analyzed without implementation of the fail- 	 failure signature will occur at a given time to failure limit 
	
ure detection system to determine a risk reduction frac- 	 in the system being analyzed. 
tion of the failure detection system. 	 65 	 16. The system of claim 15, wherein the microprocessor 
	
10. The method of claim 9, wherein said step (f) includes 	 determines a probability of a mitigation of the failure as a 
	
integrating on the computer a product of a function corre- 	 function of a time to failure limit by determining an effective- 
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ness score corresponding to an ability to respond to the at least 
one failure signature using a failure detection system to pre-
vent the at least one failure mode from reaching a failure limit 
in the system being analyzed as a function of time to failure 
limit. 
17. The system of claim 16, wherein the microprocessor 
quantifies a risk reduction based on the probability of the 
failure and the probability of the mitigation by calculating a 
failure limit occurrence probability reduction for the at least 
one signature in response to the effectiveness score, calculat- 
10 
ing a sum of failure limit occurrence probability reductions 
for each signature in the signature set, and comparing the sum 
of failure limit occurrence probability reductions for the fail-
ure detection system to a sum of overall failure limit occur-
rence probabilities in the system being analyzed without 
implementation of the failure detection system to determine a 
risk reduction of the failure detection system. 
